Rules on ‘revolving doors’ in the EU: Post-mandate restrictions on members of EU institutions and parliamentarians in Member States

Written by Silvia Kotanidis.

The term ‘revolving doors’ refers to the practice of staff who have worked in the public sector being hired by the private sector. The practice not only affects staff however, it can also apply to senior public-sector managers and those in positions of political leadership. The major advantage of this practice is that the individuals hired offer skills, resources and competences that are useful for gaining access to decision-makers, as the wealth of contacts and relations acquired upon recruitment of a person who has worked in the public sector can prove a valuable asset.

The revolving doors practice facilitates the representation of specific interests, a practice referred to as lobbying, which presents pros and cons. On the one hand, lobbying is beneficial to industry and to the public sector as it allows informed policy-making. On the other, it can pose a risk to the democratic tissue of society, as lobbying can undermine decision-makers’ integrity and lead to favouritism if not appropriately regulated. Recent cases of revolving doors have stimulated some media attention and sparked reproach. A notable recent case was that of José Manuel Barroso, the former President of the European Commission, who joined Goldman Sachs in a senior advisory position.

The phenomenon of lobbying is on the rise in Europe, in particular in Brussels. Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) reports an increase in spending on lobbying since 2015, while Transparency International reports a drastic increase in investment in lobbying by big tech companies between 2014 and 2021, of up to 360 %. In 2023, CEO also found that four of the six companies with the highest lobbying budgets were big tech companies.

The European Ombudsman (EO), whose mission is to investigate maladministration committed by the EU institutions, has examined several cases of revolving doors. In the case concerning José Manuel Barroso, the European Ombudsman, Emily O’Reilly, exchanged correspondence with Jean-Claude Juncker, the incumbent President of the Commission. The result was that the Commission President clarified that integrity and discretion are required of former commissioners, after the end of their mandates. Juncker then committed to consult the Ad Hoc Ethical Committee. The Ad Hoc Ethical Committee issued its first advice in October 2016, stating that although public opinion regarding Barroso’s future employer was not positive given its role during the financial crisis, there were no breaches of EU law. In addition, it considered that Barroso was free to accept an occupation in the private sector, given his guarantee to abstain from any lobbying on behalf of Goldman Sachs.

In 2017, the EO carried out another investigation on the revolving doors phenomenon concerning staff of the European Commission, with less positive findings. In this, the EO found that while at a systemic level rules were complied with, implementation could be improved, in particular where senior staff were concerned. The EO suggested various practices such as forbidding post-employment activity, applying restrictions, providing for fast-track decisions so that the lapse of 30 days without an official administrative position does not lead to implicit approval of a future occupation, as the rules provided. It also recommended improving communication and monitoring. In a 2022 decision, the EO encouraged the Commission to adopt a bolder approach to revolving doors, by imposing restrictions or temporal bans or giving conditional approvals.

In addition to the Commission, the EO investigated cases concerning other institutions. With respect to the European Central Bank (ECB), for instance, in one specific case the EO encouraged a more robust approach to revolving doors. When making recommendations for the revision of the ECB’s ethics framework, the EO suggested lengthening the cooling-off period for senior staff to one year, or making public the conditions whereby employment was authorised.

In an enquiry concerning the European Food Safety Authority, the EO contested that the agency had not raised any objections in one particular case, and further contested that it had not applied the EO’s recommendations in full. With respect to a specific case concerning a vice-president of the European Investment Bank, the EO reached the conclusion that maladministration had occurred, and that the role and power of the Ethics and Compliance Committee of the Bank could be strengthened. The EO reached a very similar conclusion in the decision on an inquiry concerning the European Defence Agency, where the recruitment of the chief executive to a senior position in a well-known company in the defence sector prompted the EO to find maladministration on account of the absence of a sufficiently thorough assessment of the conflict of interest risks, and insufficient use of mitigation measures in that situation. The EO considered that such a move should have been forbidden. She recommended that the Agency forbid such moves of senior staff in the future, and inform staff regarding when senior staff moves would be denied.

In the international landscape, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) have been addressing the issue of conflicts of interest and lobbying for many years. In 2010, the OECD issued recommendations for transparency and integrity in lobbying. The idea was to define the criteria for international standards, raise awareness and offer some guiding principles for countries generally. In 2021, an OECD report monitored the implementation of those recommendations and assessed that although countries had progressed in transparency, integrity and access, the majority needed to improve transparency concerning the targets of lobbyists and the actors involved. In addition, more attention needed to be given to the use of digital technologies and social media. In 2017, GRECO contributed to the formation of a comprehensive international framework, by stressing the need for transparency and integrity and by elaborating 20 principles to complement the OECD recommendations.

A 2019 special report by the European Court of Auditors (ECA) highlighted the existence of two different sets of ethical and integrity rules for members of the EU institutions (e.g. Commissioners or Members of the European Parliament – MEPs) and the institutions’ staff. Whereas the rules applicable to staff were comparable across EU institutions, rules on members usually differed depending on the role of the institution concerned. For the Council and the European Council, national rules apply except when it comes to the president of the European Council. The landscape of ethical rules for members of the EU institutions (as opposed to staff) is therefore quite fragmented. Overall, it can be said that all the EU institutions provide a code of conduct for their members and that almost all of them also have an internal advisory body responsible for giving advice on the interpretation of ethical rules or opinions on the existence of a conflict of interests in connection with a post-mandate occupation. In addition, all the institutions examined in this study provide for the obligation for members to inform their former employer (the EU institution), for a period after the end of their term of office, of the intention to engage in an occupational activity. In addition to this, almost all the institutions analysed in this study also impose some sort of restriction on the exercise of post-mandate activities. The nature of the restrictions may differ depending on the activity performed by the former member of the institution.

The cooling-off period for former members of EU institutions varies from six months to three years: six months for Members of the European Parliament; 18 months for presidents of the European Council; two years for members of the Commission, members of the European Court of Auditors and members of the European Economic and Social Committee; three years for the president of the European Commission, and for judges or advocates general of the European Court of Justice. The cooling-off period for members of high-level ECB bodies is either one year or six months, depending on the type of activity and financial institution the former member intends to join.

An overview of the existence of cooling-off periods in Member States leads to the observation that the vast majority of Member States (20) do not provide for a cooling-off period for their former members of parliament. This is true of Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Greece, Estonia, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden. In seven Member States, however, national rules do impose some form of restrictions on post-mandate activities, appointments or even acquisition of assets. In the majority of the Member States that do provide for restrictions, the legal cooling-off provision is addressed more often than not to public officials, a notion that also includes members of parliament. This circumstance therefore requires a certain interpretative effort to apply the legal limitation or restriction to the particular case of members of parliament. The limited cases where cooling-off provisions do apply are the following: Belgium – one year following appointment in an employed state function; Ireland – a one-year prohibition on lobbying in connection with previous employment; Croatia – 18 months for management appointments in an entity previously supervised by the former employer; Latvia – a two-year prohibition on performing commercial transactions with companies previously supervised, administered or for which a procurement decision was taken; Lithuania – a one year prohibition on employment in a company that in the year prior to the termination of office was supervised or in whose respect a decision on financing was taken; Hungary – a 24-month restriction on the purchase of assets in entities directly or indirectly controlled by the state or local territorial entities; and Slovenia – a two-year prohibition on representing an entity that had business relations with the former employer.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Rules on ‘revolving doors’ in the EU: Post-mandate restrictions on members of EU institutions and parliamentarians in Member States‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.