Writtten by Anna Caprile and Tim Peters with Ana Luisa Melo Almeida.
One of the first, and boldest, measures taken by Western countries as a response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was the immobilisation of the Russian central bank assets held under their jurisdictions, the value of which could be around €300 billion worldwide, according to recent estimations.
As the war is well into its fourth year, the debate on how to use the immobilised assets to sustain Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts – a cost estimated at US$524 billion – has evolved. A growing number of international legal experts and prominent political figures have defended the lawfulness of confiscating Russian central bank assets to sustain Ukraine, both for financing reconstruction efforts and military expenses, despite these assets being protected by state immunity. However, opinions among legal scholars differ significantly, as do the positions of the governments in whose countries these assets are held.
G7 countries reached an agreement in October 2024 on using the extraordinary revenues generated by those assets to service and repay a US$50 billion G7 loan to Ukraine, while the complex debate on the legality and related risks on the use of the principal capital continues. In the absence of a clear precedent or an uncontested legal basis, political considerations, such as US policy shifts, and calculations over the economic and financial risks incurred will play a decisive role in this debate. Notably, this subject was on the agenda, for the first time, of the informal meeting of EU foreign ministers in Copenhagen on 29-30 August 2025.
Read the complete briefing on ‘Confiscation of immobilised Russian sovereign assets: State of play, arguments and scenarios‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
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